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Post-Quantum Deadlines Are Set. Start With Your Vendors

NIST now deprecates RSA and ECC after 2030, and CISA, NSA and ASD published PQC questions to ask vendors. What changed and a 90-day checklist.

Two publications in the last three weeks turned post-quantum cryptography (PQC) from a research topic into a dated, procurement-driven program. On October 27, NIST finalized IR 8547, Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, which sets when today's public-key algorithms are deprecated and when they are disallowed. Then on November 5, CISA, the NSA and Australia's ASD's ACSC published Post-Quantum Questions to Ask Your Vendors, a vendor-neutral question set for procurement, contract renewals and ongoing vendor assurance.

Read together, they say the same thing: the deadlines are now fixed, and for most organizations the critical path runs through suppliers. Here is what changed, why vendors matter so much, and what to do before your next renewal cycle.

What NIST IR 8547 settled

The final report states that NIST will deprecate quantum-vulnerable public-key cryptography after 2030 and disallow its use under NIST standards and guidelines after 2035. That covers the algorithms almost everything runs on today: RSA, ECDSA and EdDSA for signatures, and Diffie-Hellman, MQV and RSA-based schemes for key establishment. NIST notes that its earlier guidance had projected disallowing 112-bit public-key schemes on January 1, 2031; the new plan replaces that with a single 2030 deprecation and 2035 disallowance schedule for all quantum-vulnerable algorithms.

A few other points in the report matter to buyers:

  • ML-KEM is the only approved post-quantum key-establishment scheme today, and NIST recommends ML-KEM-768 as the default parameter set. HQC has been selected as an alternative, with its FIPS still under development.
  • Hybrid key establishment can still be FIPS 140-validated, as long as at least one input to the combined scheme comes from an approved scheme.
  • Symmetric cryptography is not off the hook. NIST says its few symmetric standards at the 112-bit security level will be disallowed in 2030.
  • Time is short by historical standards. NIST observes that moving from standardization to full integration in information systems has taken 10 to 20 years, and it calls out the "harvest now, decrypt later" threat: adversaries collecting encrypted data today to decrypt once quantum technology matures.
Key dates: quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms are deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035 under NIST guidance. Federal high value assets and high impact systems face earlier dates: PQC for key establishment by December 31, 2030, and for digital signatures by December 31, 2031.

Federal agencies are on a faster clock

The 2030 to 2035 window is meant for lower-risk systems. IR 8547 is explicit that it does not change the earlier deadlines in Executive Order 14412 and OMB Memorandum M-26-15, issued June 24, 2026. M-26-15 directs agencies to execute a prioritized migration "with the objective of mitigating as much quantum risk as feasible by December 31, 2030," and required each agency to submit a PQC Migration Plan to OMB and ONCD within 120 days of the memo.

The memo lays out five phases: strategy, planning and discovery (2026–2027); pilots and early migration (2027–2028); prioritized migration of key establishment for high value assets, high impact systems and other highly sensitive systems (2028–2030); signature migration (2031); and full migration by 2035. It also requires agencies to support TLS 1.3 no later than January 2, 2030, and says systems incapable of supporting PQC or hybrid cryptography must be identified and given priority for replacement or decommissioning.

Several requirements land directly on vendors and contracts. M-26-15 tells agencies to reference CISA's Product Categories for Technologies That Use Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards and ensure product requirements in those categories include PQC integration. It tells agencies to engage their FedRAMP-authorized cloud providers to delineate PQC responsibilities within the shared responsibility model. Its sample role assignments make the program office or requirement owner responsible for ensuring vendor requirements include PQC-readiness and cryptographic agility provisions, and every agency plan must include a third-party coordination plan.

Why the vendor question is the hard part

Most organizations do not write their own TLS stacks, HSM firmware or VPN code. As the CISA announcement puts it, many organizations depend on vendors for managed services, cloud capabilities and cryptography-dependent products, and "effective PQC transition depends on vendor readiness." Cryptography is also embedded in long-lived, hard-to-update systems such as industrial control systems and IoT devices.

CISA's product category list, published January 23, 2026, shows how uneven readiness is. It lists cloud services (PaaS and IaaS), collaboration software, web software and endpoint security as categories where PQC products are widely available, but notes they mostly use PQC for key establishment and not yet widely for digital signatures. Networking hardware, networking software, SaaS, identity and access management hardware such as HSMs and authentication tokens, databases and enterprise security tools such as SIEM are still listed as transitioning. Operational technology and IoT are excluded from both lists.

That gap is exactly where a late surprise would come from: a firewall, HSM or identity platform that cannot support PQC in time, discovered after the contract has renewed for another five years.

What the CISA, NSA and ASD questions ask

The new guidance, first published by ASD's ACSC in July and now co-authored with CISA and the NSA, organizes its questions around five phases of a PQC transition: locate and inventory cryptographic dependencies, assess risk, triage and prioritize, implement PQC algorithms, and communicate with vendors and stakeholders. Questions highlighted in published analyses of the guidance include:

  • Locate: Does the vendor maintain a current inventory of cryptographic dependencies, such as a cryptographic bill of materials (CBOM), including third-party and embedded components? Is any cryptography hardcoded, fixed or hardware-bound? Can firmware and boot processes be updated to support PQC signature schemes?
  • Assess: What does the product assume about how long the data it handles must remain protected?
  • Triage: Which products or services will be PQC-ready early enough to support customer rollout before the end of 2030? If hybrid post-quantum/traditional modes are offered, when will the vendor move to PQC-only?
  • Implement: Which PQC algorithms will be supported, and when will support be generally available? Is PQC included in base licensing, or sold as an add-on?
  • Communicate: How will traditional cryptography be deprecated, including any temporary hybrid use?

The guidance also describes warning signs in vendor answers, among them limited visibility into where cryptography is used, general assurances instead of specifics, unclear or deferred timelines, proprietary or opaque cryptography, and PQC treated as an optional or premium feature. None of these is automatically disqualifying, but each deserves a follow-up question and, ideally, a contractual commitment.

A practical checklist for the next 90 days

  1. Map renewals to cryptography. List contracts renewing in the next 24 months for the categories CISA marks as transitioning: network and VPN gear, HSMs and PKI, identity platforms, SaaS, databases and security tooling. These are your negotiating windows.
  2. Send the questions now, not at renewal. Use the CISA, NSA and ASD question set in vendor assurance reviews and RFPs. Ask for product- and version-specific answers and dates.
  3. Ask for a CBOM. M-26-15 describes a central CBOM, fed by automated discovery from SBOM analysis, code scanning and network scanning, as the foundation of a migration plan. Vendor-supplied cryptographic inventories make yours far more complete.
  4. Write PQC into contracts. Add requirements for cryptographic agility, a published PQC roadmap, support for NIST-approved algorithms such as ML-KEM, notification of cryptographic changes, and PQC included under standard licensing.
  5. Clarify cloud responsibilities. For each major cloud and SaaS provider, document which side owns key exchange, certificates, key management and customer-managed endpoints, as M-26-15 asks agencies to do with FedRAMP providers.
  6. Get to TLS 1.3 and test hybrid key exchange. M-26-15 calls TLS 1.3 foundational for PQC at the network level. Inventory where older TLS versions terminate, including load balancers, API gateways and proxies.
  7. Flag the dead ends. Identify systems that cannot support PQC or hybrid cryptography, especially hardware-bound or firmware-signed devices, and put them on the replacement roadmap.

Where to start

The 2030 date sounds distant, but for systems with five-year hardware cycles and multi-year contracts, the decisions that determine readiness are being made in the next few renewal rounds. Baygramm helps enterprises and agencies build cryptographic inventories, assess vendor and cloud PQC readiness, and plan crypto-agile architectures as part of our cybersecurity services, and supports agencies aligning migration with FedRAMP cloud providers through our federal cloud practice. If you want a second set of eyes on your vendor questions or migration plan, talk to our team.

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