The LiteLLM Compromise: Lessons for Securing AI Supply Chains
How a leaked key and stolen tokens put credential-stealing malware into LiteLLM's official release, and what to check in your own pipelines.
NIST now deprecates RSA and ECC after 2030, and CISA, NSA and ASD published PQC questions to ask vendors. What changed and a 90-day checklist.
Two publications in the last three weeks turned post-quantum cryptography (PQC) from a research topic into a dated, procurement-driven program. On October 27, NIST finalized IR 8547, Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, which sets when today's public-key algorithms are deprecated and when they are disallowed. Then on November 5, CISA, the NSA and Australia's ASD's ACSC published Post-Quantum Questions to Ask Your Vendors, a vendor-neutral question set for procurement, contract renewals and ongoing vendor assurance.
Read together, they say the same thing: the deadlines are now fixed, and for most organizations the critical path runs through suppliers. Here is what changed, why vendors matter so much, and what to do before your next renewal cycle.
The final report states that NIST will deprecate quantum-vulnerable public-key cryptography after 2030 and disallow its use under NIST standards and guidelines after 2035. That covers the algorithms almost everything runs on today: RSA, ECDSA and EdDSA for signatures, and Diffie-Hellman, MQV and RSA-based schemes for key establishment. NIST notes that its earlier guidance had projected disallowing 112-bit public-key schemes on January 1, 2031; the new plan replaces that with a single 2030 deprecation and 2035 disallowance schedule for all quantum-vulnerable algorithms.
A few other points in the report matter to buyers:
The 2030 to 2035 window is meant for lower-risk systems. IR 8547 is explicit that it does not change the earlier deadlines in Executive Order 14412 and OMB Memorandum M-26-15, issued June 24, 2026. M-26-15 directs agencies to execute a prioritized migration "with the objective of mitigating as much quantum risk as feasible by December 31, 2030," and required each agency to submit a PQC Migration Plan to OMB and ONCD within 120 days of the memo.
The memo lays out five phases: strategy, planning and discovery (2026–2027); pilots and early migration (2027–2028); prioritized migration of key establishment for high value assets, high impact systems and other highly sensitive systems (2028–2030); signature migration (2031); and full migration by 2035. It also requires agencies to support TLS 1.3 no later than January 2, 2030, and says systems incapable of supporting PQC or hybrid cryptography must be identified and given priority for replacement or decommissioning.
Several requirements land directly on vendors and contracts. M-26-15 tells agencies to reference CISA's Product Categories for Technologies That Use Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards and ensure product requirements in those categories include PQC integration. It tells agencies to engage their FedRAMP-authorized cloud providers to delineate PQC responsibilities within the shared responsibility model. Its sample role assignments make the program office or requirement owner responsible for ensuring vendor requirements include PQC-readiness and cryptographic agility provisions, and every agency plan must include a third-party coordination plan.
Most organizations do not write their own TLS stacks, HSM firmware or VPN code. As the CISA announcement puts it, many organizations depend on vendors for managed services, cloud capabilities and cryptography-dependent products, and "effective PQC transition depends on vendor readiness." Cryptography is also embedded in long-lived, hard-to-update systems such as industrial control systems and IoT devices.
CISA's product category list, published January 23, 2026, shows how uneven readiness is. It lists cloud services (PaaS and IaaS), collaboration software, web software and endpoint security as categories where PQC products are widely available, but notes they mostly use PQC for key establishment and not yet widely for digital signatures. Networking hardware, networking software, SaaS, identity and access management hardware such as HSMs and authentication tokens, databases and enterprise security tools such as SIEM are still listed as transitioning. Operational technology and IoT are excluded from both lists.
That gap is exactly where a late surprise would come from: a firewall, HSM or identity platform that cannot support PQC in time, discovered after the contract has renewed for another five years.
The new guidance, first published by ASD's ACSC in July and now co-authored with CISA and the NSA, organizes its questions around five phases of a PQC transition: locate and inventory cryptographic dependencies, assess risk, triage and prioritize, implement PQC algorithms, and communicate with vendors and stakeholders. Questions highlighted in published analyses of the guidance include:
The guidance also describes warning signs in vendor answers, among them limited visibility into where cryptography is used, general assurances instead of specifics, unclear or deferred timelines, proprietary or opaque cryptography, and PQC treated as an optional or premium feature. None of these is automatically disqualifying, but each deserves a follow-up question and, ideally, a contractual commitment.
The 2030 date sounds distant, but for systems with five-year hardware cycles and multi-year contracts, the decisions that determine readiness are being made in the next few renewal rounds. Baygramm helps enterprises and agencies build cryptographic inventories, assess vendor and cloud PQC readiness, and plan crypto-agile architectures as part of our cybersecurity services, and supports agencies aligning migration with FedRAMP cloud providers through our federal cloud practice. If you want a second set of eyes on your vendor questions or migration plan, talk to our team.
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